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Excessive credit growth is often considered to be an indicator of future problems in the 
financial sector. This paper examines the issue of how to determine whether the observed 
level of private sector credit is excessive in the context of the “countercyclical capital 
buffer”, a macroprudential tool proposed in the new regulatory framework of Basel III by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. An empirical analysis of selected Central 
and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic, provides alternative 
estimates of excessive private credit and shows that the HP filter calculation proposed by 
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Nontechnical Summary 
The historical experience of the CEE countries with the credit boom in 2004–2007 offers the 
possibility of applying the method proposed by the Basel Committee within its Basel III 
regulatory package to calculate and discuss what countercyclical capital buffer level these 
countries might have had if the newly proposed regulation on the creation of capital buffers had 
existed before the crisis.  
The motivation for this analysis is to determine how suitable the Basel Committee’s proposed 
method for calculating excessive credit using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter for the credit-to-
GDP series is for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In these countries, rapid credit 
expansion may simply mean convergence to values typical of the advanced nations, and not 
excessive borrowing. For this type of country, we propose to use a method involving estimation of 
the equilibrium private credit level obtained using economic fundamentals. 
The HP filter method applied on credit-to-GDP has its drawbacks. A time series trend is 
dependent to a significant extent on the length of the chosen time series and the calculation is very 
sensitive to the smoothing parameter (lambda). A big problem as regards practical application in 
macroprudential policy is “end-point bias”, which generates a highly unreliable estimate of the 
trend at the end of the data period. Another relevant question is whether the credit ratio should 
take into account other denominators besides GDP, such as financial assets or total assets of the 
private sector.  
The paper offers a so-called “out of sample method” (OOS) based on estimating the model on a 
different sample of countries and applying the elasticities so obtained to the data for the countries 
for which the equilibrium credit level is being estimated. We draw upon the existing studies on 
this topic, which use the developed countries of the EU or OECD as appropriate countries for 
OOS comparison (Kiss et al., 2006; Égert et al., 2006).  
We use the PMG (pooled mean group) estimation method, introduced for panel estimates by 
Pesaran et al. (1999). This method can be used to estimate the long-run relationship between the 
credit-to-GDP ratio and other variables, which is identical for all countries, whereas the short-run 
adjustment to this long-run relationship can differ across countries. The PMG model therefore 
allows heterogeneity of the estimates for individual countries in the short run. However, the long-
run relationship of the cointegrated variables is common to all the countries in the sample. 
The OOS calculations may in some cases imply significantly different conclusions regarding 
excessive credit compared to the calculations using the HP filter. According to the HP filter, the 
credit-to-GDP gap indicates excessive credit in the recent period not only for the Czech Republic, 
but also, for example, for Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania and Poland, whereas the OOS estimate 
does not confirm this excessive credit level. By contrast, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia 
had excessive credit-to-GDP ratios according to the OOS method. Finally, the size of the capital 
buffer was calculated for individual CEE countries using the two alternative methods using the 
mid-2008 data as the starting point for the buffer calculation.  
                                        Credit Growth and Capital Buffers: Empirical Evidence 





The Basel III reforms to the banking sector regulatory framework agreed in 2010 contain an 
important macroprudential element intended to dampen the potential procyclicality of the 
previous capital regulation. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010a) has 
introduced a “countercyclical capital buffer” aimed at protecting the banking sector from periods 
of excessive credit growth, which have often been associated with growth in systemic risk. In 
good times, banks will – in accordance with set rules – create a capital reserve which can then be 
used to moderate contractions in the supply of credit by banks in times of recession. 
One region that recorded a boom in lending to the private sector in the lead-up to the global 
financial crisis was the Central and East European (CEE) countries.
1 The observed credit 
expansion was driven by many factors relating to both the demand and supply side of the credit 
market. Although the credit growth in these transition economies started from very low levels, the 
rate of growth in many countries has raised concerns about how sustainable such growth is in the 
medium term and whether it poses significant risks to the stability of the financial sector. 
This paper aims to draw on the historical experience of the CEE countries with credit expansion 
and, using the method proposed by the Basel Committee, to calculate and discuss what the 
countercyclical capital buffer level these countries might have had if the newly proposed 
regulation on the creation of capital buffers had existed before the crisis. The motivation for this 
analysis is to determine how suitable the Basel Committee’s proposed method for calculating 
excessive credit using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is for the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. In these countries, rapid credit expansion may simply mean convergence to values typical 
of the advanced nations, and not excessive borrowing. For this type of country, we propose to use 
a method involving estimation of the equilibrium private credit level computed using economic 
fundamentals. Given that different countries have different characteristics, the Basel Committee 
allows national regulators to exercise discretion and specify different methods for setting the 
countercyclical capital buffer. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the risks associated with excessive credit 
expansion, looks at the situation in selected EU countries before the global financial crisis broke 
out, and briefly examines the logic of the countercyclical capital buffer as proposed by the Basel 
Committee. Section 3 takes a closer look at the disadvantages of applying the HP filter method 
and proposes an alternative technique for calculating excessive credit – the out-of-sample method. 
Both these calculation methods are then used on data for ten CEE countries. Section 4 illustrates 
the different implications of the alternative indicators of excessive credit growth for the 
countercyclical capital buffer settings of the banking sectors of the countries analysed. The 
conclusion attempts to generalise the results of the analysis and formulate recommendations for 
the national authorities responsible for macroprudential policy.  
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2. Excessive Credit Growth 
Credit growth in CEE countries has caught the attention of many studies over the past decade. 
These studies have tried to identify not only the determinants of credit growth, but also its 
equilibrium level (Enoch and Ötker-Robe, 2007; Égert et al., 2006). The credit boom in some 
transition economies was strong enough to raise concerns about whether this trend was simply a 
manifestation of convergence to the average credit levels in advanced nations, or whether it was a 
case of excessive growth posing a risk to macroeconomic and financial stability (Hilbers et al., 
2005). The central banks and supervisory authorities of some countries even assessed the situation 
as critical and in 2004–2007 introduced a series of tools for limiting credit growth (Dragulin, 
2008; Herzberg, 2008). These tools generally included monetary policy tools (increases in official 
interest rates or reserve requirements justified by policymakers with reference to “rapid credit 
growth”), regulatory measures (increased risk weights on selected loans, restrictions on loan-to-
value and/or debt-to-income ratios, increases in provisioning rates, tighter regulation of large 
exposures and tougher rules on collateral valuation), soft non-binding measures (the introduction 
of guidelines and recommendations) and also very “hard” administrative restrictions on credit 
portfolio growth (as applied, for example, in Bulgaria). The extent of the measures, as measured 
by the number of different tools used to limit credit growth in individual countries, was correlated 
to a large degree with the credit growth rate (see Figure 1). While the number of policy measures 
might not be the best proxy for the degree of policy interventions, given the available data and 
information it at least serves as a relatively reliable indicator of policymakers’ effort. At the same 
time, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the tools used, since most of them were applied 
just before the global financial crisis erupted. The decline in credit growth observed since then 
may thus have been due more to the sharp economic contraction and reduced demand for loans. 
The studies conducted up to now tend to conclude that the aforementioned tools are pretty 
ineffective and that credit booms can be limited in only a very limited way during good times 
(Kraft, 2005; Herzberg, 2008).                                         Credit Growth and Capital Buffers: Empirical Evidence 




Figure 1: Credit Growth and Number of 
Tools Applied to Limit Credit Booms 
(x-axis: number of measures; y-axis: average 
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Figure 2: Private Credit Ratios in Selected 
EU Countries 
(x-axis: credit-to-GDP ratio as of 2007 Q4) 
 
 


















Source: IMF, national authorities´ websites         Source: IMF IFS, authors´ calculations 
Despite the comparatively strong credit boom observed in 2003–2007, the stock of loans in many 
CEE countries in the pre-crisis year 2007 was still relatively low, especially in comparison with 
other EU countries (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, in terms of the private-credit-to-GDP ratio, some 
countries of the region had reached levels typical of some euro area countries. The question 
therefore arises whether they were already showing excessive credit levels. One limitation of this 
comparison is that is based solely on data on domestic bank loans. This indicator understates total 
private credit, as it neglects loans provided by non-bank financial intermediaries and loans 
provided directly from abroad.  
Excessive credit growth can threaten macroeconomic stability in many ways. Given that lending 
supports consumption, growth in private sector loans can over-stimulate aggregate demand 
beyond the framework of potential output and cause the economy to overheat, with knock-on 
effects on inflation, the current account deficit, interest rates and the real exchange rate. 
At the same time, lending institutions can, in an economic growth phase, have over-optimistic 
expectations about borrowers’ future ability to repay their debts and therefore very often lend to 
high-risk borrowers. The upshot is that the bulk of “potentially” bad loans arise during upward 
phases of the credit cycle. In some CEE countries, private loans were provided in foreign currency 
because foreign interest rates were lower (see Figure 3). This further increases the risks for the 
banking sector, because if the domestic currency depreciates, the volume of credit expressed in 
the domestic currency rises, debt servicing costs go up, and foreign exchange risk turns into credit 
risk. In many cases, therefore, the aforementioned measures to contain credit growth were 
targeted primarily at reducing growth in foreign currency loans (Steiner, 2011). Furthermore, if a 
domestic credit boom is financed from foreign sources, as was the case in several CEE countries 
(except for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland), the risk of the domestic banking sector 
having insufficient balance-sheet liquidity (roll-over risk) increases. In economic bad times, 6   Adam Geršl and Jakub Seidler 
 
   
domestic banks face a high risk of outflows of short-term foreign funds that cannot be financed by 
the sale of liquid assets (Hilbers et al., 2005).
2 Although this study, focusing on excessive credit 
growth, would benefit from an analysis of different loan types, such detailed disaggregated data is 
not available in a sufficiently long time series for the countries under examination. 
Figure 3: Shares of Foreign Currency Bank 
Loans 
(as of end-2009; as % of total loans to given 
sector) 
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Figure 4: Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
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Note: Slovak Republic and Slovenia were already   Source: CNB 
members of the euro area in 2009, so their  
foreign currency loans comprise currencies  
other than EUR. 
Source:  E C B         
A bursting of the credit bubble and negative macroeconomic developments, leading to external 
financing constraints and growth in non-performing loans (NPLs), can therefore cause the 
banking sector serious difficulties. IMF (2004) estimates that more than 75% of credit booms 
were followed by banking or currency crises. This fear is consistent with existing studies in the 
field of early warning signals, according to which excessive credit growth can be considered one 
of the most reliable indicators of future problems in the banking sector (Borio and Lowe, 2002; 
Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Jimenez and Saurina, 2006; Saurina et al., 2008). 
As part of the preparation of the new Basel III regulatory framework for banks, the Basel 
Committee (BCBS, 2010) has proposed several tools for reducing the procyclical behaviour of the 
banking sector.
3 One of the key tools is a proposal for banks to create countercyclical capital 
buffers during credit booms.
4 Such buffers, expressed as a percentage of risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) and covered by high quality capital (Tier 1, or even core Tier 1), would be set by the 
regulator within the range of 0% to 2.5%. As a guide for the setting of the buffer, the Basel 
                                                           
2 In this regard, the Czech Republic has a very favourable deposit-to-loan ratio. For a comparison with other EU 
countries, see CNB (2010, section 1.3.1). 
3 The issue of procyclicality of the financial system and its sources and potential consequences was discussed in 
a thematic paper in last year’s CNB Financial Stability Report 2009/2010 (Geršl and Jakubík, 2010). 
4 With regard to the objective of reducing the procyclicality of the financial system, the Basel Committee stated 
explicitly in its December 2009 consultative document (BCBS, 2009) that the aim of this buffer was to “achieve 
the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess credit growth”.                                        Credit Growth and Capital Buffers: Empirical Evidence 




Committee is proposing to use and regularly publish the difference between the current private 
credit ratio as a percentage of GDP and its trend value estimated using the HP filter (the “credit-
to-GDP gap”). However, regulators may also use other methods to calculate the trend and other 
variables, such as the prices of various relevant assets and credit conditions. In bad times, this 
capital buffer would be “released” in order to slow any fall in the credit supply and thereby reduce 
the procyclicality of the financial system. 
The Basel Committee document itself (BCBS, 2010b) proposes to use the aforementioned guide 
as follows. The capital buffer would start to be created when the credit-to-GDP gap exceeded two 
percentage points. If the gap reached 10 percentage points or more, the buffer would reach the 
aforementioned maximum of 2.5% of RWA. For gaps of between 2 and 10 percentage points, the 
buffer would vary linearly between 0% and 2.5%. For example, for a gap of six percentage points 
the buffer would be 1.25% of RWA (see Figure 4). For cross-border exposures, the buffer set by 
the regulator in the foreign jurisdiction would apply. For cross-border banking groups, the capital 
buffer would be applied on both a solo and a consolidated basis. 
It became clear during the discussion phase within the Basel Committee that a simple filtering 
technique would in many cases not necessarily lead to reliable estimates of excessive credit, so the 
final version of Basel III (BCBS, 2010b) gives regulators considerable discretion to set the buffer. 
The primary aim of the buffer, however, is not to restrict credit growth, but to create a capital 
reserve to give the banking sector greater protection from sudden changes in the credit cycle. At 
the same time, the Basel Committee documents emphasise the complementarity of this buffer with 
other macroprudential tools (BCBS, 2010b, p. 5), such as various limits on key indicators of 
borrowers’ ability to repay loans (the loan-to-collateral and loan-to-income ratios). 
 
3. Methods for Estimating the Equilibrium Credit Level 
A major problem in constructing an excessive credit growth indicator is determining what level of 
credit is excessive and might pose a threat to the financial sector. One traditional method is to 
apply the statistical Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, which obtains the trend from a time series. By 
comparing the actual credit-to-GDP ratio with its long-term trend obtained using the HP filter we 
can then estimate whether or not the credit level is excessive. This method is used quite routinely 
in the literature (Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and Drehmann, 2009). Hilbers et al. (2005), for 
example, consider a credit-to-GDP gap of greater than five percentage points to be an indicator of 
excessive credit in the economy.  
Although the HP filter method is used quite often to determine trends in macroeconomic 
variables, it does have its drawbacks. A time series trend is dependent to a significant extent on 
the length of the chosen time series and the calculation is very sensitive to the smoothing 
parameter (lambda). A big problem as regards practical application in macroprudential policy is 
“end-point bias”, which generates a highly unreliable estimate of the trend at the end of the data 
period.
5 Macroprudential policy, which, by contrast, requires assessment of the trend on the basis 
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of current (i.e. end-of-period) data, would therefore be reliant on indicators subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty. In the case of some CEE countries with relatively short time series, credit 
growth is incorporated directly into the trend itself by the HP filter, i.e. excess credit growth is 
counted as a trend (Cottarelli et al., 2005). Another relevant question is whether the credit ratio 
should take into account other denominators besides GDP, such as financial assets or total assets 
of the private sector. Although GDP is correlated to a significant extent with private sector income 
and therefore serves as an indicator of the ability to repay a given amount of loans, holdings of 
financial assets (deposits and securities investments) and non-financial assets (e.g. real estate) are 
also relevant to the evaluation of excessive credit. 
Figure 5 presents credit gaps with alternative denominators (GDP and financial assets and total 
assets of the private sector) calculated using the HP filter on data for bank loans in the Czech 
Republic with a high lambda parameter equal to 400,000. Such a high value of lambda was 
proposed in Basel III with the argument that the credit cycle is usually longer than the business 
cycle. The filter is applied to quarterly data for the period 1998–2010, which, however, is 
regarded as relatively short from the international perspective (Basel III recommends at least a 20-
year period). The estimates indicate that the current level of bank loans is below the long-term 
trend. However, the trend estimate is subject to a range of problems related to the short time series 
and above all to extraordinary factors linked with a fall in credit volume in 1998–2002 caused by 
a banking crisis in the 1990s and the clean-up of bank balance sheets ahead of the privatisation of 
large banks.  
As regards simulating possible macroprudential policy in the past, it makes more sense to apply 
the HP filter recursively, i.e. in each past period using only the data that were available in that 
period (at the end of 2005, for example, the trend value and therefore also the gap between the 
observed credit level and the trend is calculated on 1998–2005 data). This simulates the situation 
that the macroprudential policy-maker would hypothetically have found itself in had it been 
required to decide whether excessive credit growth was emerging. The calculated credit gaps 
expressed as a percentage of GDP indicate that the Czech Republic would have found itself in a 
situation of excessive credit as early as 2004 (see Figure 5). However, the aforementioned 
drawbacks of the HP filter play an even greater role in the calculated gap, as the problem period 
of 1998–2002 influences the trend.                                         Credit Growth and Capital Buffers: Empirical Evidence 




Figure 5: Credit Gaps in the Czech Republic 
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Figure 6: Credit-to-GDP Ratios for a Similar 
Level of Economic Development 
(in %; GDP per capita, in PPP, constant 2005 
international $; approximately $22,500 for the 
Czech Rep as of 2010) 











Source: CNB, authors´ calculations         Source: IMF IFS, WB WDI, authors´ calculations 
 
The main criticism of the HP filter technique, however, is that it does not take into account 
economic fundamentals that affect the equilibrium stock of loans. An alternative method is to 
estimate the equilibrium private credit level in relation to key economic variables (such as the 
level of development of the economy measured in terms of real GDP per capita).This method says 
that if GDP per capita – as a proxy for the standard of living of an economy – is the main and only 
economic fundamental, all countries with the same level of development should have a similar 
equilibrium credit level. Poorer countries should have a lower equilibrium credit level than 
wealthier countries. A positive linkage between the credit-to-GDP ratio and the economic 
development of a country is referred to as financial deepening (see Terrones and Mendoza, 2004). 
A comparison of bank loans as a percentage of GDP for the Czech Republic in 2010 and selected 
euro area countries in years when they were at a similar level of economic development indicates, 
in contrast to the HP filter findings, that the credit ratio in the Czech Republic is below the level 
consistent with its economic level (see Figure 6). 
Other economic fundamentals besides the above-mentioned GDP per capita should also be 
considered as factors influencing the equilibrium credit level in a particular country, and a suitable 
econometric model should therefore be employed. However, given that the CEE countries started 
from very low private credit levels, the estimation of such a model on data for these countries 
would capture the rapid growth caused by convergence towards the average level of the advanced 
nations. As Égert et al. (2006, p. 14) point out, such estimated elasticities of the relationships 
between fundamentals and credit would be overstated. At the same time, the estimates would 
reflect not the equilibrium level, but only the present relationship between economic fundamentals 
and private credit.  10   Adam Geršl and Jakub Seidler 
 
   
For this reason, the existing literature suggests using out-of-sample (OOS) panel estimation, i.e. 
estimating the model on a different sample of countries (“in-sample countries”) and applying the 
elasticities obtained to the data for the countries for which the equilibrium credit level is being 
estimated (“out-of-sample countries”). This approach assumes a priori that the stock of credit of 
the in-sample countries, which serve for estimating elasticities, is at equilibrium on average, 
which is quite a significant assumption. Therefore, one needs to choose a suitable group of “in-
sample” countries that best meets the need to estimate the correct equilibrium relationships 
between economic fundamentals and private credit. The existing studies on this topic therefore 
normally use the developed countries of the EU or OECD as appropriate countries for comparison 
(Kiss et al., 2006; Égert et al., 2006). For this study, the advanced EU countries were used as in-
sample countries. While a possible approach would be to narrow down the number of sample 
countries to the ones similar in structure to the CEE countries, the econometric methodology used 
and the availability of data in the time dimension do not allow us to significantly reduce the 
number of in-sample countries. However, owing to the current debate regarding the excessive 
debt of the PIIGS
6 countries, these countries were omitted from the calculation of the equilibrium 
credit level.
7 
However, to estimate the equilibrium elasticities for the given countries, the proper set of 
fundamental variables influencing the credit-to-GDP ratio must be found. As the analysis of 
possible credit determinants is beyond the scope of this paper, we refer to previous studies for a 
comprehensive discussion regarding possible credit determinants; see, for example, Égert et al. 
(2006) and the references therein. Based on these studies, we use data on aggregate household 
consumption, government debt, short-term interest rates, unemployment, inflation measured by 
the GDP deflator and the CPI index, and GDP per capita.  
The data were mostly obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS (International 
Financial Statistics) database, which provides the required macroeconomic data with a sufficient 
history (which is vital for estimating long-run relationships). For this reason, we used data for a 
30-year period (1980–2010). The available statistics on bank loans to the private sector were used 
as the credit indicator. As stated earlier, these statistics slightly underestimate the total credit of 
the private sector, as they do not include non-bank financial intermediaries (e.g. leasing) and 
cross-border loans.
8 However, as the financial system in CEE countries is primarily bank-based, 
using bank credit only should not introduce considerable bias into our estimates.  
We applied a set of panel unit root tests for the above-mentioned variables, and some of them 
were found to be nonstationary in levels, i.e. I(1) processes. A more detailed summary of the 
results is provided in the Appendix. Further, cointegration was tested for selected groups of 
variables using the Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test. The results confirmed one 
cointegration relationship between the credit-to-GDP ratio, the household consumption-to-GDP 
ratio and GDP per capita for the set of in-sample countries. As discussed above, the presence of 
the GDP per capita variable in the long-run relationship is desirable as it captures the different 
                                                           
6 Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. 
7 However, nations that are structurally quite different from the CEE countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
remain in the sample of control countries. This may skew the results of the analysis towards higher equilibrium 
credit values for a given set of economic fundamentals. Nevertheless, the method used (see later in the text) 
would control for the cyclical component of excessive debt in the sample of countries used. 
8 A detailed description of the available data is provided in the Appendix.                                        Credit Growth and Capital Buffers: Empirical Evidence 




degree of wealth of the economy, which therefore also influences the equilibrium private credit 
level (Terrones and Mendoza, 2004). 
A variety of econometric methods can be used for OOS estimation. Nevertheless, given the 
properties of the variables used, traditional panel methods run into the problem of nonstationary 
time series, mutual regression of which can lead to spurious results. The traditional solution to the 
problem of nonstationarity of variables involves differentiating them. This step allows us to obtain 
the short-run relationship between the variables by regression, but the longer-run relationship is 
lost in the differentiation. The long-run relationship between nonstationary variables can be better 
estimated if the variables are cointegrated. This fact is used by the ECM (error correction model) 
method, which estimates not only the long-run relationship between the cointegrated variables, 
but also the potential deviation from this long-run relationship, which is gradually corrected 
through short-run adjustments. 
Based on the characteristics of the time series used and the character of our study, focusing on the 
long-term equilibrium credit level, we employ the PMG (pooled mean group) estimation method, 
introduced for panel estimates by Pesaran et al. (1999). The PMG estimator is an error correction 
form of the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) model, where the dependent variable in its 
first differences is explained by the lagged independent and dependent variables in both levels and 
first differences. This method can be used to estimate the long-run relationship between the credit-
to-GDP ratio and other variables, which is identical for all countries, whereas the short-run 
adjustment to this long-run relationship can differ across countries. The PMG model therefore 
allows heterogeneity of the estimates for individual countries in the short run. However, the long-
run relationship of the cointegrated variables is common to all the countries in the sample. The 

















j t h i j h i
p
j





, , , ,
1
1
, , , , , 1 , , ) ( ε γ β α ρ , 
 
where y is the dependent variable, x is the independent variable, max1 and max2 represent the 
maximum lags used, and α, β, γ and ρ are the estimated coefficients. Parameter ρ is the country 
specific error correction term. Coefficient α represents the long-term relationship, which is 
specific for each cross-section in the case of the so-called mean-group (MG) estimator or the same 
for every country in the case of the PMG estimator. For more details see Pesaran et al. (1999).  
The long-term relationship of the given equation is taken as a cointegrated relationship, which 
was found for the credit-to-GDP ratio, the household consumption-to-GDP ratio and GDP per 
capita. We also employed a different set of other variables and their lags that might affect the 
short-run adjustment of the credit-to-GDP ratio to its long-run relationship. For example, the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio might capture any crowding out of bank lending to the private 
sector.
9 Also, the real interest rate, or changes therein, should, as the cost of financing, be in a 
                                                           
9 For this reason, we would expect a negative relationship between the government debt ratio and loans to the 
private sector. The fact that a less indebted government sector would be able to provide more significant support 
if the banking sector ran into serious problems is relevant for assessing whether the current private sector credit 
level is excessive with regard to financial stability. 12   Adam Geršl and Jakub Seidler 
 
   
negative relationship with the explained variable. However, these variables were not significant 
even at the 15% level. 
The following equation gives the final estimates of the coefficients of the long-run relationship 
between the cointegrated variables and the values of the coefficients and the constant term in the 
short run, which are presented below as the mean of all the estimates for the countries 
concerned.
10 
∆ (credit/gdp)t = −0.035(credit/gdpt-1 −(0.7cons/gdpt +0.013gdp/popt)) +   }long-run relationship 
     (∗∗)     (∗∗∗)  (∗∗∗) 
  + 0.87∆(cons/gdp)t −0.07inft + 0.014   }short-run adjustment  
  (∗∗)  (∗)  (∗∗∗) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance of the estimated coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels 
respectively.  
Credit/gdp represents the ratio of private sector credit to GDP, cons/gdp denotes the ratio of household 
consumption to GDP, gdp/pop is GDP per capita in thousands of dollars and inf is the change in the 
price level, expressed as the year-on-year change in the GDP deflator.  
On the basis of the model, short-run adjustment dynamics towards the long-run trend is given as a 
function of the change in the consumption-to-GDP ratio and as a function of inflation. Based on 
the estimated coefficients, we can conclude that in the long-run relationship the credit-to-GDP 
ratio increases with increasing wealth of the economy and with an increasing consumption-to-
GDP ratio. This factor then positively affects the explained variable in the short-run relationship 
as well, while inflation acts in the opposite direction. These conclusions are in accordance with 
intuition as regards the effects of the variables used on the credit-to-GDP ratio. 
The estimated parameters of the model were applied to the data for the CEE countries to obtain 
values of the “equilibrium” credit ratio. As we are interested in the long-run fundamental-based 
level of the credit-to-GDP ratio, we used only the coefficients of the estimated long-run 
relationship between the cointegrated variables. This approach controls in parallel for the credit 
cycle of in-sample countries, as only equilibrium sensitivities between credit and economic 
fundamentals are extracted. The results indicate that the OOS calculations may in some cases 
imply significantly different conclusions regarding excessive credit compared to the HP filter 
values computed on the end-2009 data (see Figure 7). According to the HP filter, the credit-to-
GDP gap indicates excessive credit in the recent period not only for the Czech Republic, but also, 
for example, for Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania and Poland, whereas the econometric estimate 
does not confirm this excessive credit level (values in the positive part of the chart indicates 
excessive private credit-to-GDP ratios). By contrast, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia now 
                                                           
10 Based on the Hausman test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of PMG being an efficient estimator, so PMG 
is preferred over its mean-group (MG) counterpart. The MG estimator is the simple non-weighted mean of the 
regression estimates for each country. The Hausman statistic χ
2(2) is equal to 0.9 (p-value = 0.637). Furthermore, 
only those variables which were significant at least at the 10% confidence level were kept in the estimated 
equation. Also, a more empirical approach was used as in Sekine (2001), so inflation is present in the short-run 
part of the equation but not in the long-run part. Moreover, the low value of the correlation coefficient between 
cons/gdp and gdp/pop indicates no possible multicollinearity problem.                                        Credit Growth and Capital Buffers: Empirical Evidence 




have excessive credit-to-GDP ratios according to the OOS method. It is clear, therefore, that the 
two calculation methods used give contradictory results in some cases. 
Figure 7: Comparison of Credit-to-GDP Ratios for Various Calculation Methods 
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Source: IMF IFS, authors’ calculations 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of the study, further refinement of the estimates with respect to 
different loan types and their currency denomination would be desirable. However, current data 
limitations leave this additional analysis as a future research question. 
 
4. Implications for the Size of the Capital Buffer 
One of the questions associated with the new Basel III rules is whether the requirement to create a 
countercyclical capital buffer would contribute to the creation of capital reserves in those CEE 
countries which experienced significant problems in their banking sectors during the global 
financial crisis. In the following simulation, the size of the capital buffer is calculated for 
individual CEE countries using the two aforementioned methods, i.e. the HP filter method and the 
econometric OOS method. As the crisis did not manifest itself fully in the CEE countries until late 
2008 and (in particular) 2009, i.e. after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, we 
set mid-2008 as the starting point for the buffer calculation.  14   Adam Geršl and Jakub Seidler 
 
   
Table 1: Simulation of Countercyclical Buffer Calculation 
(data as of 2008 Q2) 
HP filter Out-of-sample HP filter Out-of-sample
Bulgaria 11.4 10.8 2.5 2.5
Czech Rep. 9.5 -15.0 2.4 0.0
Estonia 5.3 27.9 1.0 2.5
Lithuania 6.9 -8.3 1.5 0.0
Latvia 1.0 19.6 0.0 2.5
Hungary -1.4 -10.7 0.0 0.0
Poland 3.0 -23.3 0.3 0.0
Romania 6.1 -27.3 1.3 0.0
Slovakia 6.1 -22.8 1.3 0.0
Slovenia 5.4 5.5 1.1 1.1
Credit-to-GDP gap (%)
Countercyclical capital buffer 
(% of RWA)
 
Source: authors´ calculations 
 
The results of this simple simulation indicate that only four countries needed a countercyclical 
capital buffer according to the OOS method (Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia needed the maximum 
possible 2.5% of RWA, while Slovenia needed 1.1% of RWA).  
Figure 8: Credit-to-GDP gap via out-of-
sample and Tier 1 ratio in 2008 
(gap in p.p.; Tier 1 capital ratio in 2008) 
Chart 8
Credit-to-GDP gap via out-of-sample and Tier 1 ratio in 2008
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Figure 9: Credit-to-GDP gap via out-of-
sample and change in RoE 
(gap in p.p.; change in RoE of banking sector in 
p.p.)
Chart 10
Credit-to-GDP gap via out-of-sample and change in RoE
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Source: IMF, authors´ calculations          Source: IMF, authors´ calculations 
It is relevant to ask whether the banking sectors of these countries had a sufficient capital reserve 
already in 2008 and were building a “would-be” capital buffer composed of high-quality loss-
bearing capital (such as common shares and retained earnings, i.e. in essence a major part of Tier 
1 capital) in anticipation of possible problems in the banking sector due to the credit boom. Figure 
8 indicates that the countries identified by the OOS method as having excessive credit ratios (i.e. 
Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia) had relatively low Tier 1 capitalisation. The only exception was 
Bulgaria, which had set its minimum regulatory limit for total capital adequacy at a higher level 
(12%) than the traditional 8%, a fact which is also reflected in a higher observed Tier 1 ratio.                                        Credit Growth and Capital Buffers: Empirical Evidence 




Several indicators can be used to compare the impacts of the crisis on the banking sectors of 
individual countries. In this paper, we look at the change in banking sector profits between 2008 
and 2009 (in p.p. of return on equity, RoE), as profitability reflects both credit and market losses 
as well as the impact of possible higher funding costs on pre-provision income. A simple 
graphical analysis reveals that two countries identified by the OOS method as having excessive 
credit ratios (Estonia and Latvia) recorded large losses in their banking sectors in 2009, causing 
the RoE to decline dramatically (see Figure 9). Two of the countries identified, namely Latvia and 
Slovenia, saw their governments stepping in and providing public support in 2009. It is worth 
mentioning that the HP method would not have identified the problems building up in the Latvian 
and Estonian economies, which were hit hard by the crisis and, especially in the case of Latvia, 
suffered very high real costs. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Lessons 
This paper discusses methods for calculating excessive private sector credit in the Central and 
Eastern European countries and their suitability as regards the input needed to calculate the 
countercyclical capital buffer introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS, 2010). The BCBS has recommended the use of an excessive credit indicator based on the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter technique as a guide for setting this buffer.  
The paper shows that the HP filter-based calculation of the excessive credit indicator is not 
necessarily appropriate in certain cases. For the CEE countries in particular, rapid credit 
expansion may simply mean convergence to values typical of the advanced nations, and not 
excessive borrowing. As an alternative, the paper suggests considering excessive credit 
calculation methods that better reflect the evolution of a country’s economic fundamentals. One 
such method is an out-of-sample technique based on estimates for advanced EU countries which 
are subsequently used to calculate the equilibrium credit levels of the CEE countries. 
Although statistical filtering techniques such as the HP filter do have a role to play in the analysis 
as a first step in the interpretation of the available data, a broader set of indicators and methods 
should be employed to determine a country’s position in the credit cycle. Our chosen method, 
based on economic fundamentals, would have better identified the problem of excessive credit in 
those CEE countries whose banking sectors recorded serious problems during the crisis. Although 
this calculation technique also has its limitations and could be further developed, it can at least be 
considered by the macroprudential authority responsible for setting capital buffers as a 
complementary indicator of excessive credit, especially for small converging economies. 
There is a clear policy lesson arising from our analysis for macroprudential policy, in which 
countercyclical buffers will serve as one of the main instruments: national authorities cannot rely 
on a single indicator only and have to apply judgement, ideally supported by a variety of analyses 
that help them to identify the position of the economy in the credit cycle with respect to economic 
fundamentals. Given the current preparatory phase for the implementation of Basel III, including 
the countercyclical capital buffer, it is crucial to start building a robust, credible and transparent 
buffer regime that policymakers will apply through the credit cycle once Basel III is fully 
implemented.  16   Adam Geršl and Jakub Seidler 
 
   
This issue is especially important within the EU, as Basel III will be implemented in the EU 
countries as part of the Capital Requirements Directive (“CRD IV”) and the Capital Requirements 
Regulation, which will be binding on all EU countries and will be centred on the idea of a “single 
rulebook” (or “maximum harmonisation”). The European Commission published rather advanced 
drafts of both documents in July 2011 and wants to finalise them by the end of 2011 or in early 
2012. Throughout the proposal, the call for a single rulebook is clearly visible and national 
discretions are limited across a number of regulatory issues. In the area of capital buffers, while 
the July 2011 proposal gives national policymakers discretion in setting the buffer rate, it limits 
the discretion regarding the methods and variables used to calculate the buffer, as it requires the 
set of variables to be agreed on within the European Systemic Risk Board.
11 Nevertheless, the 
idea of “maximum harmonisation” is still under review in relevant European fora given that it 
could effectively prevent national policymakers from strengthening the prudential requirements 
and thus hamper their ability to conduct national macroprudential policy effectively. 
  
 
                                                           
11 The proposal allows for a part of the buffer to be set independently of ESRB guidance, but this part could be 
reviewed only annually (as opposed to the quarterly review of the countercyclical buffer), the variables used 
could be of a structural nature and no international reciprocity would apply. Clearly, such a “structural” buffer at 
hand for national policymakers would not be a too effective instrument for macroprudential policy.                                        Credit Growth and Capital Buffers: Empirical Evidence 
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Appendix 
A. Detailed Description of the Data Time Series Used 
Table A1 
Time Series' Codes Description
IMF IFS: AF.ZF... National Currency per US Dollar average period
IMF IFS: 22D..Z
IMF IFS: 32D..ZF...
IMF IFS: 32AN.ZW... Claims on general government (net)
IMF IFS: 222A..ZF... Claims on general government (net)
IMF IFS: 60P..ZF... Interest rate
IMF IFS: 64...ZF... Index CPI
IMF IFS: 67R..ZF... Unemployment rate
IMF IFS: 99Z..ZF... Population
IMF IFS: 96F..ZW... Household consumption expenditures (incl. NPISH) *
IMF IFS: 99BIPZF... Deflator HDP (base year = 2005)
IMF IFS: 99B..ZF... Gross Domestic Product in the National Currency
WB WDI: NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) **
Claims on private sector
 
Note: *NPISH = Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households  
   ** Linearly interpolated from yearly to quarterly frequency 
Source: IMF IFS Database, WB WDI Database 
Time series of interest rates for some countries were completed using the ECB and Eurostat 
databases and data provided by national central banks. 
B. Panel Unit Root Tests 
The standard set of panel unit root tests was applied, i.e. Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Breitung 
(2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests – see Maddala 
and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). Since the set of tests generates extensive output, the results are 
presented parsimoniously as a summary table for particular variables. However, detailed results 
are available upon request. 
Table A2 
Variable Result Note
consumption / gdp I(1) Not confirmed by LLCH
credit / gdp I(1)
gdp per capita I(1)
gdp per capita in PPP I(1)
government debt / gdp I(0)
inflation (cpi) I(0) Not confirmed by LLCH
inflation (deflator) I(0)
lending rate I(0) Not confirmed by LLCH
real lending rate I(0)
unemployment rate I(0)
 
Note: LLCH = Levin, Lin and Chu test for common unit roots across countries. 
Source: authors´ computation CNB WORKING PAPER SERIES 
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